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ABSTRACT
This report documents the performance of the thermal protection system, field joint
protection system, and systems tunnel components of flight set 360L007 as evaluated
by postflight hardware inspection.
The condition of both motors was similar to previous flights. Four aft edge
strikes were noted on the ground environment instrumentation thermal protection
system. The hits all left a clean substrate, indicating that the damage was caused
by nozzle severance debris and/or water impact. No National Space Transportation
System debris criteria for missing thermal protection system were violated.
Two problem reports were written against the field joint protection system.
The first concerned two cracks in the K5NA closeout over the trunnion/vent valve
location on the left-hand aft field joint. A similar condition was observed on
Flight 5 (360H005B). The second problem report referred to a number of small
surface cracks between two impact marks on the left-hand forward field joint.
Neither area exhibited loose material or any abnormal heat effects, and they have
no impact on flight safety.
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ACRONYMS
deg .......... degree
FJPS ......... field joint protection system
ft ........... feet
GEI .......... ground environment instrumentation
hr ........... hour
in ............ inch
IPR .......... interim problem report
JPS .......... joint protection system
KSC ......... Kennedy Space Center
L ........... launch
LCC ......... launch commit criteria
LH .......... left hand
NSTS ........ National Space Transportation System
PEEL ........ Postflight Engineering Evaluation Limit
RH .......... right hand
RSRM ........ redesigned solid rocket motor
SRB ......... solid rocket booster
STS .......... Space Transportation System
TPS ......... thermal protection system
V ........... volt
° F ........... degrees Fahrenheit
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INTRODUCTION
STS-33R was launched from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on 22 Nov 1989. Two
redesigned solid rocket motors (RSRM) were used and were designated 360L007A
and 360L007B. The three field joints on each motor (total of six field joints) were
protected by the field joint protection system (FLIPS) (Figure 1). The FJPS is used
to keep the field joint O-rings above the minimum hunch commit criteria (LCC)
temperature during the launch countdown, to keep rain water from entering the
field joint, and to protect the joint components from aerodynamic heating during
flight. The igniter-to-case joint on each RSRM was fitted with an igniter heater to
keep the igniter seals above minimum LCC temperature requirements during launch
countdown (Figure 2).
The ground environment instrumentation (GEI) and heater power cables are
protected by the thermal protection system (TPS). The purpose of the TPS is to
protect the GEI and heater systems from aeroheating during flight.
Ai_r solid rocket booster (SRB) separation and splashdown, the SRBs were
recovered and towed to KSC's Hangar AF for postflight inspection and disassembly.
Retrieval and tow-back were delayed 24 hr by high sea states. The FJPS, TPS,
systems tunnel, and igniter heater installation inspections were performed per
Postflight Engineering and Evaluation Plan TWR-50050, Vol I (Reference 1).
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OBJECTIVE
The objectiveof this report is to document any heater anomalies during the launch
countdown and any anomalies to the FJPS, TPS, or systems tunnel components
during flightand recovery operations. This report willalso address allsquawks or
problem reports initiatedduring postflightevaluation.
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Postflight assessment results indicate that all TPS and systems tunnel components
were in very good to excellent condition (compared to previous flights) with typical
flight heat effects and erosion. No squawks or problem reports were written against
the TPS or systems tunnel. There were a total of four aft edge hits: three on the
left-hand (LH) motor and one on the right-hand (RH) motor, with the largest
missing piece of TPS cork measuring 2.5 by 2.5 by 0.5 inches. The hits all left a
clean substrate, indicating that the damage was caused by nozzle severance debris
and/or water impact. No Postflight Engineering Evaluation Limit (PEEL)
requirements or National Space Transportation System (NSTS) debris criteria for
missing TPS were violated.
Two anomalies were observed on the LH aft and LH forward field joints and
were documented as Problem Reports PV-6-146407 and PV-6-146109, respectively.
The anomaly in the LH aft field joint consisted of two circumferential cracks in the
K5NA closeout over the trunnion/vent valve location. The cracks were about 2 in.
long and did not exhibit loose material or any abnormal heat effects. The LH
forward field joint had two small impact marks on the forward edge and a series of
small surface cracks in between. These also showed no abnormal heat effects.
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CONCLUSIONS/
RECOMMENDATIONS
The joint protection system (JPS) heaters performed as expected and maintained the
field joint temperatures within the LCC required range during hunch countdown.
Postflight inspection verified that the TPS, FJPS, and systems tunnel all performed as
designed, with typical flight heat effects and erosion. The two anomalies reported on
the FJPS did not exhibit loose material or any abnormal heat effects and had no
impact on flight safety or schedule.
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DISCUSSION
5.1 PREFLIGHT HEATER CONTROL SYSTEM AND PERFORMANCE
The fieldjoint heaters and igniter-to-casejoint heaters performed nominally during
the launch countdown. The igniterheaters were activatedbetween L - 24 hr and L
- 6 hr 20 minutes, and maintained the jointswithin the LCC temperature limitsof
90" to 108°F at alltimes. However, the temperature control band was changed
from 95 ° +5°F to 95 ° +I'F, resulting in more frequent cycling and better heater
control.
The fieldjoint heaters were activatedbetween L - 11 hr 20 minutes and L - 1
minute, and maintained an acceptable 17°F sensor temperature range from 90 ° to
107°F during the LCC timeframe. Prior to launch, an LCC contingency was created
to lower the minimum redline temperature at any fieldjoint from 85 ° to 69°F in
the event of a complete heater failure. An interim problem report (IPR) was written
against the LH aft fieldjoint heater, which read 290 V instead of the nominal
209 V. This IPR was dispositionedwhen itwas determined that the voltage must
have been nominal since the current reading was nominal. In addition,the heater
circuitbreaker was not tripped,as itwould have been had the voltage actuallybeen
290 V.
5.2 POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION OF FJPS, TPS, SYSTEMS TUNNEL,
AND IGNITER HEATER INSTALLATION
The condition of both motors was similar to previous flight motors, with most of the
heat effects occurring on the inboard side of the aft segments. These areas
experience high aerodynamic heating normal to protuberance components. They
also receive the high plume radiation and base recirculation heating induced by the
adjacent SRB and space shuttle main engines on the aft-facing surfaces. There was
slight charring of the TPS over the GEI cabling runs in this area, typical of previous
flights.
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5.2.1 Field Joint Protection System
The FJPS was in good condition overall. There were no signs of ablation on any of
the JPS, with only slight paint blistering on the cork cover. The paint on the
KSNA closeout aft of the cork was also slightly darkened and blistered, with
occasional pitting. This condition was typical of previous flights and was probably
due to aerodynamic heating and the result of nozzle severance debris and water
impact.
Numerous small cracks were observed on the forward edge of the LH forward
FJPS cork between 240 and 260 deg (Figure 3). Impact marks were noted on each
side of the affected area approximately 3 tt apart. Problem Report PV-6-146407 was
written against these cracks (Appendix A). The cracks measured approximately 0.50
in. axially by less than 0.10 in. radially and were within the current material
acceptance requirements. The impact marks were most likely caused by a parachute
float line. A limit was added to the PEEL stating that cracks in the FJPS that
meet current acceptance criteria are acceptable and should not be reported.
Two circumferential cracks were found in the K5NA closeout over the
trunnion/vent valve on the LH aft field joint at approximately 30 deg (Figure 4).
The cracks were parallel (about 1.25 in. apart) and measured approximately 2.0 in.
wide by less than 0.10 in. deep. The KSNA around the cracks was bulged out about
0.10 in. and could be depressed approximately 0.10 in. with hand pressure. Problem
Report PV-6-146109 was written against these cracks (Appendix A). This condition
was noted on a previous flight (360H005), and it was determined that a vacuum (due
to vent valve operation) developed under the moisture seal during descent. This
caused the moisture seal to be pulled down over the pin retainer band trunnion.
The resulting stress in the K5NA induced a split. Since the condition occurred after
SRB separation, there is no impact on flight safety and no corrective action was
taken.
A 4- by 2-in. local blister was observed on the LH center field joint at 45 deg.
There was peeling of the Hypalon paint in the area and cork was eroded from the
surface approximately 0.05 to 0.10 in. deep. This damage was a first-time occurrence
and was probably caused by burning debris from the nozzle severance system. No
squawks or problem reports were written against this condition.
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Figure 4. Splits in K5NA Ablation Compound
(U-I aft field Joint)
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5.2.2 Thermal Protection System
TPS performance was considered to be excellent during flight operation, with typical
heat effects and no ablation. There were no in-flight anomalies, squawks, or
problem reports written against the TPS.
There were a total of four aft edge hits: three on the LH forward center
segment and one on the RH forward segment. The TPS cork pieces that were
missing alllefta clean substrate,indicatingthat the hits were caused by nozzle
severance debris and/or water impact. The largest GEI cork piece missing was
approximately 2.5 by 2.5 by 0.5 in.,or 3.1 in.3.This piece was located at Station 691
on the RH forward segment at approximately 240 deg. No PEEL requirements or
NSTS debris criteriafor missing TPS were violated.
5.2.3 Systems Tunnel
The cork TPS adjacent to the systems tunnel floorplate was in excellent condition.
There was very littlepaint blistering,and allK5NA closeouts over cables and tunnel
seams were in excellent condition. No in-flightanomalies, squawks, or problem
reports were written against the systems tunnel.
5.2.4 I_iter Heater and Forward Dome Power Cable Installation
Postflightinspection of the igniterheater installationand power cables revealed no
anomalies. The igniterheater, cork, and band clamp were removed and inspected at
Hangar AF; no anomalies were noted.
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POSTFIRE OBSERVATION RECORD (PFOR) A-4
Field Joint External Insulation Condition
Motor No.; 360L007 I Side: Loll (A)
Assessment Engineer(s): "7-_.J_'_At_J , _, /_IC ic,,_/J
IDate: /
Jolnl: Aft (AFT)
FIQId Joint External Insulation Observations; Yes No Comment #
A. Charred/Heal Affected Material (HTAFF)? v"
B. Missing TPS Material > 0.7 cu. In. Due To v_
Ascent/Motor Operation (TPSVD)?
C. Missing TPS Materiel > 0.7 cu. In. Due To v"
Reantry/DebrlslWater Impact (TPSDM)?
D. UnbondslCracks (DEBND)? v" /
E. Evidence of Water Leakage From Field ,I"
Joint (WATER)?
F. MlssinglUnbonded Vent Valves (MISSG)?
(FWD, CTR, and AFT Joints only.)
Record the following If any of the above conditions exist:
Starting Ending Starting Ending Clrcum-
Condillon Slatlon Station Degree Degree ferentlal Axial Radial
(Observation Location Location Location Location Width Length Deplh Volume
Code) (In.) (In.) (dog.) (dog.) (In.) (in.) (In.) (in. 3)
Notes I Comments
/. Cg,_elL--._ _J l_r_ldA dl.oS_cu T oYO-a _r_..u_1olg
Clarification shoot(s) attached?
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Aft Segment TPS Clarification Form
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POSTFIRE ANOMALY RECORD (PFAR)
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I. PFAR NUMBER 3. INSPECTION LOCATION 4. REFERENCE SQUAWK NUMBER 5. REFERENCE PR NUMBER
360LOOTA-03 KSC X T 24/T-97 33-030 PV6-146109
2. SRM MOTOR NUMBER N-F A-2 6. REFERENCE IFA NUMBER F. REFERENCE SPR NUMBER
360LOOTA ...... N/A N/A
8. TITLE
CRACK IN KSNA CLOSEOUT OVER FJPS TRUNNION
9. CLASSIFICATION
OBSERVATION X MINOR ANOMALY MAJOR ANOMALY CRITICAL ANOMALY
,o.P RTNUMBERI I )ASERIALNUMBERI I iE  RTDESCRIPTIONIU76803-01 JOINT PROTECTION SYSTEM
13. REPORTED BY (NAME / ORGANIZATION / OBSERVATION DATE)
S. V. HICKEN / THERMAL INSULATION DESIGN ENGINEERING / 11/26/89
14. RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT TEAM / PROGRAM MANAGER
JPS / G. I. STEPHENS
15. RESPONSIBLE PROJECT ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION }
R. S. JENSEN / SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ENGINEERING
16. RESPONSIBLE DESIGN ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION)
C. I. PROKOP / STAGE HARDWARE DESIGN
17. DESCRIPTION (ATTACH PFOR, FIGURES, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC.)
Two circumferential splits were four_d in the K5NA on the aft field joint at approximately 30 degrees measuring
approximately 2.0 inches wide by 0.10 inch deep. The _p(its were about 1.25 inches apart. The KSNA around the
splits was bulged out approximately 0.10 inch, was sl_ r_jy, and could be depressed approximately 0.10 inch with hand
pressure.
18. JUSTIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION (POSTFIRE ENGINEERING EVALUATION LIMITS)
The K5NA split occurred during descent This condition w0s noted on a previous flight (360H005) and has no impact
on flight schedule or safety. No new corrective action will be implemented.
19. CAUSE
Vacuum under the moisture seal during descent caused the moisture seal to be pulled down over the pin retainer band
trunnion. The resulting stress in the KSNA induced a split.
20. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION 21. ANOMALY APPROVAL SIGNATURE
None. RPRB SECRETARY: DATE:
/S/S. T. MUNSON 12/13/89
22. OBSERVATION/ANOMALY APPROVAL SIGNATURES
PE: DATE:
/S/R. S. JENSEN 12/20/89
PM: DATE:
/S/G. I. STEPHENS 01/05/90
23. RESULTS OF RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION 24. REPORT RESULTS TO RPRB? YES NO X
N/A ......
25. RPRB CLOSURE SIGNATURE
(REQUIRED ONLY IF BLOCK 24 CHECKED "YES")
RPRB SECRETARY: DATE:
N/A N/A
26. OBSERVATION/ANOMALY CLOSURE SIGNATURE
PM: DATE:
/S/G. I. STEPHENS 01/05/90
2F. ORIGINATION DATE I 28. REQUIRED STATUS DAIE I 29. PR CLOSURE DATE I 30. PFAR CLOSURE DATE
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Motor No.: 360L007
Assessment Engineer(s):
POSTFIRE OBSERVATION RECORD (PFOR) A-4
Field Joint External Insulation Condition
I Side: Left (A) I De,e:
Joint: Forward (FWD)
Field Joint External Insulation Obsewations; Yes No Comment #
A. Charred/Heat Affected Material (HTAFF)? v--
B. Missing TPS Material > 0.7 cu. In. Due To _._
Ascent/Motor Operation (TPSVD)?
C. Mlsslng TPS Material > 0.7 cu. In. Due To
ReentrylDebrls/Water Impact (TPSDM)?
D. UnbondslCracks (DEBND)? ,ti I
E. Evidence of Water Leakage From Field v"-
Joint (WATER)?
F. Mlssing/Unbonded Vent Valves (MISSG)?
(FWD, CTR, and AFT Joints only.)
Record the following If any of the above condltlons exist:
Slertlng Ending Starting Ending Circum-
Condition Station Station Degree Degree ferentlal Axial Radial
(Observation Location Location Location Location Width Length Depth Volume
Code) (In.) (In.) (deg.) (des.) (in.) (In.) (in.) (In. 3)
Notes I Comment_
]. NU/_ous .S M.,4-(.. L O£Ao.rE 01_
f_tP_C_4VT_ FL6AF LI_JE) OAI _.71dt_
Clarification sheet(I) attached?
REVISION
no _-._/_' yea (Provide clarification number(s).)
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Motor No.: 360L007
Assessment Engineer(s):
Forward Segment TPS Clarification Form
I Side: ]_[Left (A) [] Right (B) I
/
o,le: lllz_,) _q
Sketch Forward Segmenl TPS Observations Below:
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POSTFIRE ANOMALY RECORD (PFAR)
1. PFAR NUMBER 3. INSPECTION LOCATION 4. REFERENCE SQUAWK NUMBER I 5. REFERENCE PR NUMBER
360LOO7A-O5 KSC X T-24/T-97 33"031 1 PV6-146407
2. COMPONENT PROGRAM TEAM H-T A-2 6. REFERENCE IFA NUMBER I 7. REFERENCE SPR NUMBER
JPS ...... N/A I N/A
8. TITLE
IMPACT MARKS/SURFACE CRACKS ON FORWARD FIELD JOINT FJPS
.......................................................................................................................
9. CLASSIFICATION
OBSERVATION MINOR ANOMALY X MAJOR ANOMALY CRITICAL ANOMALY
10. JUSTIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION
This is a first-time occurrence but this condition imposes no impact on flight safety or schedule.
11. PART NUMBER I 12. SERIAL NUMBER I 13. PART DESCRIPTION
IU76803-01 1 N/A I FIELD JOINT PROTECTION SYSTEM
14. REPORTED BY (NAME / ORGANIZATION / OBSERVATION DATE)
S. V. HICKEN / THERMAL INSULATION DESIGN ENGINEERING / 11/26/89
15. RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM MANAGER (NAME / ORGANIZATION) I 16. RESPONSIBLE POSTFIRE ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION)
G, L. STEPHENS / JPS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT I G. S. NIELSON / POSTFIRE HARDWARE ENGINEERING
17. RESPONSIBLE INTEGRATION ENGINEER (NAME / ORGANIZATION) I 18. RESPONSIBLE ACT{ONEE (NAME / ORGANIZATION)
R. S. JENSEN / SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ENGINEERING I C. L. PROKOP / STAGE HARDWARE DESIGN
19. DESCRIPTION (ATTACH PFORS, FIGURES, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC.)
Numerous small cracks were observed on the forward edge of the forward field joint FJPS cork from 240-to-260
degrees. Impact marks were noted on each side of the affected area approximately 3 feet apart. The cracks measured
approximately 0.50 inch axialty by less than 0.10 inch radially.
20. HISTORY
None. This is the first time that cracks of this type have been reported.
21. CAUSE
Cracks of this size meet the current material acceptance requirements. The impact marks were most likely caused by
a parachute float line.
22. CORRECTIVE ACTION
Add a limit to the PEEL stating that cracks in the FJPS that meet current acceptance criteria are acceptable and
should not be reported.
23. RESULTS
TWR-5OO50, Vot. I, Rev. C will state "Cracked cork or KSNA with no missing material - Acceptable".
4.'REPORT RESULTS TO RPRB_ 26. APPROVAL THROUGH CORRECTIVE ACTION 27. CLOSURE
YES NO X RPRB SECRETARY: DATE: RPRB SECRETARY: DATE:
...... /S/S. T. MUNSON 12/13/89 N/A N/A
.............................. SIE: DATE: :_6__ /_ #0
25. RPRB MEETING DATES /S/R. S. JENSEN 12/20/89 PM DATE:
ORIGINATION: 12/13/89 PM:
CLOSURE: N/A /S/G. L. STEPHENS 01/05/90
REV. 2/I/90
TWR- 17546 VOL. VII
B-4 Page
PR CLOSURE APPROVAL Ref. P.F.A.R. Number:. 360LOO7A-05
Eneineerine Avvroval
Signature
Quality Assurance Approval
N.A.S.A. Resident O.A. Avvroval
Signature Date
N.A.S.A.R.M.O. Mananer Avvroval
Date
N.A.S.A.S.R.M. Chief Eneineer Approval
Date
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I iTEMS: -- I iTEMS: I iTEMS: I ITEMS: ]ITEMS: I ITEMS:
30. DISPOSITION/CAUSE/CORRECTIVE ACTION
34. DATA CODE
37. RC ACTION REQD
I--I YES [_ NO
ITEMS:
KSC FORM 2.151 (REV. 12181)
32. SYSTEM RESTORED
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k
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KSC FORM 2--155 (REV. 6184)
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G. Stephens
R. Jensen
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1
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